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Introduction
In 1915 Turkey, Turkish gendarmes play the so-called “game of swords,” which involves tossing Armenian women from horses and impaling them on swords sticking up from the 
ground (BALAKIAN, 2003, p. 315). In 1942, the men of Ger-
man Police Battalion 101 kill 1,500 Jews from Jozefow, Poland. 
Often their bullets strike the targets in such a way that “blood, 
bone splinters, and brains” spray everywhere (BROWNING, 
1998, p. 64). The men are “quite literally saturated in the blood 
of victims shot at point-blank range” (BROWNING, 1998, p. 
162). In 1994 Rwanda, Hutus kill their Tutsi victims with low-
tech weapons such as machetes and clubs studded with nails. 
They chop off arms, legs, and breasts. They throw children 
down wells (DIAMOND, 2005, p. 316). They impale people 
like kebabs (HATZFELD, 2005, p. 81). They cut the Achilles 
tendons of those they cannot kill right away to keep them from 
running (ALVAREZ, 2001, p. 109; TAYLOR, 2002, p. 164).
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According to Donald Black, all conflicts result from 
movements of social time – changes in diversity, 
stratification, or intimacy. This is true of genocidal 
conflicts, which involve changes in diversity and 
stratification. Genocide results from increases in 
diversity, such as through intercultural contact, 
and decreases in stratification, such as when 
members of a subordinate ethnic group seek 
to increase their status. But genocide is also a 
movement of social time, a reduction of diversity 
and an increase in stratification, and it causes 
further conflict. The theory presented here 
explains the conflicts that lead to genocide as 
well as those that result from it.
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De acordo com Donald Black, todo conflito resulta de 
movimentos do tempo social – alterações na diversi-
dade, na estratificação, ou no grau de intimidade. É o 
caso para os conflitos genocidas, que envolvem trans-
formações em termos de diversidade e estratificação. 
Genocídios resultam de ampliações na diversidade, 
como no caso do contato intercultural, e reduções na 
estratificação, como quando membros de um grupo 
étnico subordinado buscam elevar seu status. Mas 
o genocídio é ele próprio um movimento no tempo 
social, uma redução da diversidade e um aumento na 
estratificação, e que provoca ainda mais conflito. A teo-
ria aqui apresentada explica os conflitos que levam ao 
genocídio, bem como aqueles que dele resultam.
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These are glimpses of genocide – a form of ethni-
cally based mass killing (CAMPBELL, 2011). Genocide 
scholars sometimes focus on “desk killers,” “bureaucra-
tization,” and the like, but scenes like these remind us of 
the reality of so much face-to-face, enthusiastic killing. 
These behaviors shock and disturb us, and we may refer 
to genocide as “extraordinary human evil” (WALLER, 
2002, pp. 9-22), a “miracle of evil” (OPDYKE and ARM-
STRONG, 1999, p. 118), an “icon of evil” (BERGER, 
2004, pp. 145, 157), “more than wickedness (…) more 
than barbarity” (quoted in HATZFELD, 2005, pp. 27, 
50), the “most heinous” variety of violence (PINKER, 
2011, p. 320), or the “work of Homo sapiens at its worst” 
(DAVIS, 2005, p. 35). Condemnations of genocide are 
not explanations, though, and if we are to explain geno-
cide, we must not confuse our own moral judgments 
with those of the killers. The truth is that the killers of-
ten see themselves as righteous and their targets as evil. 
Recognize this and genocide immediately becomes easi-
er to understand. Though we see the targets of genocide 
as victims and find the violence against them shocking, 
the killers see them as offenders, wicked people who de-
serve their punishment – apostates, heathens, invaders, 
rebels, traitors, parasites, murderers, or thieves.
In sociological terms, genocide is not just de-
viant behavior ,  a behavior that some people con-
demn; it is also social control ,  a way of handling 
deviant behavior. It arises out of conflicts – clashes 
of right and wrong. In previous work, I have offered 
a theory of genocide as social control(CAMPBELL, 
2009; 2010; 2011). But this was limited in that, as a 
theory of social control, it explained only the han-
dling of ethnic conflicts, not the conflicts them-
selves. Here I focus on genocidal conflicts – the 
conflicts that give rise to genocide, and also those 
arising from genocide. As we shall see, the same 
theory can help us better understand why geno-
cides occur and why people react to them as they 
do. The theory is sociologist Donald Black’s (2011) 
new theory of conflict, which views all conflict as 
the result of movements of social time.
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Social space and social time
Social time is a new concept in Black’s pure sociology, a 
theoretical strategy that previously explained various kinds of 
behaviors only with their location and direction in social space. 
Black introduced pure sociology – and the idea of social space 
– in The Behavior of Law (1976), which predicted the extent to 
which law, or “governmental social control,” would be used in 
response to conflicts. For example, within a society, conflicts 
across greater distances in social space – such as conflicts be-
tween strangers – attract more law than closer conflicts – such 
as conflicts between intimates (BLACK, 1976, pp. 40-48). Thus, 
the killing of a stranger, to give one example, is punished more 
severely than the killing of an intimate (COONEY, 2009, pp. 
156-167). Conflicts at higher elevations in social space – such 
as conflicts between two high-status persons – attract more law 
than conflicts at lower elevations – such as conflicts between 
two low-status persons (BLACK, 1976, pp. 16-21). When hus-
bands kill their wives, then, the killing is treated more severely 
the higher the couple’s status (COONEY, 2009, pp. 36-37). 
Conflicts with a downward direction in social space – such as 
when someone has a grievance against a subordinate – attract 
more law than upward conflicts – such as when someone has 
a grievance against a superior (BLACK, 1976, pp. 21-29). In 
many slave societies, for example, masters could kill their slaves 
without penalty, while slaves who killed their masters were tor-
tured and executed (COONEY, 2009, pp. 39-42).
Subsequent to The Behavior of Law, Black and oth-
ers not only expanded and applied the theory of law (e.g., 
BAUMGARTNER, 1992; BLACK, 1989; COONEY, 1994; 
2009), they also applied pure sociology to the explanation of 
social control generally (BLACK, 1998; HORWITZ, 1990)
and to specific forms of social control – such as collective 
violence (SENECHAL DE LA ROCHE, 1996), domestic vio-
lence (BAUMGARTNER, 1993), suicide (MANNING, 2012; 
forthcoming), drug testing (BORG and ARNOLD, 1997; 
BORG 2000), employee theft (TUCKER, 1989), criticism 
(HOFFMANN, 2006), and apology (COONEY and PHIL-
LIPS, 2013)2. Using the same theoretical strategy, we can ex-
amine any form of social control. Every conflict has a position 
in social space, and this explains how it is how it is handled.
2 Pure sociologists have mos-
tly studied social control and 
conflict, and that is the focus 
here, but the strategy may 
be applied to any form of hu-
man behavior, and it has in 
fact been applied to subjects 
such as art (BLACK, 1998, pp. 
168-169), ideas (BLACK, 2000; 
PHILLIPS and LAPUCK, for-
thcoming), research (JACQUES 
and WRIGHT, 2008), welfare 
(MICHALSKI, 2003), and preda-
tion (CAMPBELL, forthcoming; 
COONEY, 1997a; 2006: 58-60; 
COONEY and PHILLIPS, 2002).
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This is the strategy I have used in my work on genocide. 
Genocide, I have argued, is a direct function of social dis-
tance and inequality. It is more likely when the antagonists 
are lacking in intimacy, interdependence, cultural similar-
ity, and other forms of closeness, and when the aggressors 
have more authority, military power, and other forms of sta-
tus than the targets. This theory enables us to predict when 
conflicts are most likely to be handled with genocide, who 
is most likely to participate, and whom the participants will 
target (CAMPBELL, 2009). It also explains the occurrence 
of predatory behaviors alongside genocide (CAMPBELL, 
forthcoming), the differences between cases of genocide 
(CAMPBELL, 2011) and the puzzling phenomenon of con-
tradictory behavior, where the same individuals act as killers 
and rescuers (CAMPBELL, 2010). But as noted above, what 
it does not do is to explain the conflicts themselves – why 
the aggressors have grievances against the targets to begin 
with. Nor does it take into account the seriousness of the 
conflict – the nature of the grievances. It explains the han-
dling of conflicts only with their position in social space.
But why are some conflicts more serious than others? 
And why do they occur in the first place? In regard to geno-
cide, why would anyone have grievances against Turkish 
Armenians, European Jews, Rwandan Tutsis, or any of the 
other targets? Answering these questions requires a theory 
that explains what people define as wrong and whom they 
define as wrongdoers – a theory of conflict rather than just 
a theory of social control. Black’s new theory of conflict an-
swers such questions, and it does so, as noted above, with 
the concept of social time. 
What is social time? It is simply the dynamic dimen-
sion of social life. Social life is unstable. No position in 
social space is fixed. Cultural distance, which refers to di-
versity, or cultural differences, increases and decreases as 
people accept and reject new ideas, new forms of music, or 
new ways of dressing. Relational distance, which refers to 
a lack of intimacy, increases and decreases as relationships 
end and new ones begin. Vertical distance, which refers 
to inequality, or stratification, increases and decreases as 
people gain and lose status. In other words, social space 
fluctuates – it changes. And just as change in the physi-
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cal world may be identified with time, so too in the social 
world: Social change is social time. Each fluctuation of so-
cial space, then, is what Black calls a “movement of social 
time”, and it is these movements of social time, he says, that 
cause all conflict (2011, pp. 4-5). 
Movements of social time cause conflict, and the faster 
and greater the movements, the more conflict they cause. 
All deviant behaviors, for example, are movements of social 
time. This is why they cause conflict, why they are deviant. 
So rape causes conflict – people condemn it, criminalize 
it, and punish it – because it is a drastic reduction of re-
lational distance, a movement of relational time. Likewise, 
heresy causes conflict because it is a movement of cultural 
time, and theft causes conflict because it is a movement of 
vertical time. The same is true of cross-dressing, blasphemy, 
intolerance, insanity, bad manners, drunkenness, homicide, 
trespassing, promiscuity, adultery, lying, voyeurism, pub-
lic nudity, and arrogance: All are movements of social time 
(BLACK, 2011, pp. 3-9).
Not all movements of social time are deviant behaviors, 
though. People sometimes praise those who form new re-
lationships or achieve new successes. And many illnesses, 
injuries, and deaths may have no human cause. But such 
movements of social time may cause conflict even when 
they are not themselves defined as deviant. They may inten-
sify or cause conflicts about other things, as when former 
friends or lovers begin finding fault with one another as they 
grow more distant. Or they may lead to false accusations of 
wrongdoing. In many societies, for example, someone who 
is downwardly mobile, such as a wealthy person who sud-
denly becomes poor due to illness, may falsely accuse some-
one of witchcraft, while someone who is upwardly mobile, 
such as a poor person who suddenly becomes very wealthy, 
may be the target of false accusations (BLACK, 2011, pp. 
10-11, 15-16, 61-63, 83-84). Not all conflicts are as they 
seem, then, but all conflicts have the same kinds of causes: 
increases or decreases in diversity (in Black’s terminology, 
“overdiversity” or “underdiversity”), increases or decreases 
in intimacy (“overintimacy” or “underintimacy”), or in-
creases or decreases in stratification (“overstratification” or 
“understratification”) (Idem, pp. 5-6).
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The causes of genocide
The fundamental cause of genocide is overdiversity. 
Whenever two previously separated ethnic groups come 
into contact, conflict results. And wherever two ethnic 
groups live alongside one another, conflict is present. The 
latter situation may not seem to involve an increase in cul-
tural diversity, and at the societal level, it may not. But in 
any multicultural society, people are constantly encounter-
ing those who are different, increasing the diversity in their 
lives. Diversity is thus an unstable property of social life, and 
as Black puts it, “who says diversity says conflict” (2011, p. 
102). This applies to all types of diversity – including politi-
cal, religious, and ethnic diversity. All lead to cultural clash-
es, even if only mild ones. Cultural clashes have a tendency 
to intensify, though. In most cases, if I offend you, our con-
flict may remain between the two of us. But if my political 
beliefs offend you, so do the beliefs of all those who share 
them – Democrats if I am a Democrat, Republicans if I am 
a Republican. The same is true of religion: A conflict with 
me over religion is also a conflict with my co-religionists. 
In cultural conflicts, then, the stakes are high. All cultural 
conflicts are prone to collectivization. This is all the more 
true of ethnic conflicts, since ethnic groups, whatever the 
reality, are normally thought of as extended kinship groups, 
and ethnic identity is relatively unchangeable. One thing 
this means is that those who are closest to us – our mothers 
and fathers, husbands and wives, sons and daughters – usu-
ally share our ethnicity. In any ethnic conflict, all who are 
closest to me, those I care about the most, are on my side. I 
am more likely to join in their grievances and fight in their 
battles. And since I cannot alter my ethnicity, I cannot easily 
switch sides, or come to share your view. Ethnicity is thus an 
especially dangerous cultural distinction.
An increase in ethnic diversity alone may lead to geno-
cide – or similar behavior – such as when certain tribal 
groups kill all outsiders they encounter (BLACK, 2011, p. 
103). Usually, however, something else must happen: An in-
ferior group rises (or threatens to rise) or a superior group 
falls (or is in danger of falling). These social changes are 
understratification, reductions in stratification. Recall that 
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genocide normally involves superior ethnic groups attack-
ing inferior ones. But prior to the genocide, the stratification 
between these groups decreases, and this causes the conflict 
that leads to genocide. Note that even though this involves 
a change in inequality rather than culture, all conflicts that 
occur across cultural boundaries – such as across ethnic 
boundaries – are in danger of becoming cultural conflicts. 
When murders or thefts cross ethnic boundaries, they are 
no longer just murders or thefts of individuals, but offenses 
by one group against another. Even if the original conflict 
has nothing to do with ethnicity, interethnic conflict has the 
potential to become collective, with each side mobilizing its 
own ethnic supporters.3
Scenarios of genocide
Colonialism is one situation that may involve large 
and sudden increases in diversity. In the 1850s, for exam-
ple, white ranchers began moving into the Round Valley of 
Northern California, the home of the Yuki Indians. Eth-
nic conflict began immediately, as the white settlers made 
use of the valley without much regard to the prior inhabit-
ants. They depleted wild game and other natural resources, 
fenced off areas of land used by the Indians, and kidnapped 
and enslaved Indian women and children, sometimes for 
their own use and sometimes to sell to others. The Indians 
then began killing stock belonging to the ranchers. And it 
was this offense – the Indians’ theft – that led to genocide. 
At first the genocide consisted of unconnected genocidal 
expeditions. Whenever cows, horses, or hogs were miss-
ing or found dead, the aggrieved ranchers would gather 
together a group of men to go out and kill nearby Indians 
– perhaps 50 at a time. Later, the settlers successfully pe-
titioned the state government to fund a more permanent 
militia group – the Eel River Rangers – to deal regular-
ly with such offenses (MILLER, 1979; CARRANCO and 
BEARD, 1981). As Black (2011, p. 87) notes, theft is always 
a reduction of wealth, and when, as in these cases, some-
one of lower status steals from someone of higher status, 
theft decreases stratification, if only slightly.
3  Although all cultural con-
flict is collective in logic, 
and although all intereth-
nic conflict may potentially 
collectivize, other features 
of conflicts help determine 
whether collectivization ac-
tually occurs (SENECHAL DE 
LA ROCHE, 2001; see also 
CAMPBELL, 2011, pp. 593-
595).
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The Round Valley Genocide was similar to the killings 
of other California Indians and to the killings of Aborigines 
in Australia (KROEBER, 1961; REYNOLDS, 2006). In these 
cases the natives sometimes killed white settlers in addition 
to stealing from them, and in other colonial genocides, even 
greater threats to stratification might occur. In South-West 
Africa, for instance, an organized rebellion against German 
imperialism led to genocide of the Hereros in the early 1900s 
(DRECHSLER, 1980; MADLEY, 2004). What we see in all 
these cases is a massive increase in diversity, when two previ-
ously separated ethnic groups come into contact, followed by 
a decrease in stratification – sometimes very small, but some-
times much larger – when the natives offend the settlers.
Many other cases of genocidal conflict, though, do not 
begin with sudden increases in diversity. In Rwanda, for ex-
ample, Tutsis and Hutus had lived alongside one another for 
centuries prior to the 1994 genocide. The degree of overdiver-
sity was low, the result of fluctuations of cultural diversity in 
daily life rather than the drastic increases that arise from pre-
viously separated groups coming into contact. The degree of 
understratification, on the other hand, was much greater. The 
minority Tutsis had been politically subordinate to Hutus for 
decades when, in 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) – 
consisting mostly of Tutsi exiles from Rwanda – launched an 
invasion from Uganda. Prior to this, Rwanda’s ruling party 
had faced an internal political challenge, and the president, 
Juvénal Habyarimana, had allowed rival political parties to 
form. After the invasion, he began peace talks with the RPF 
and eventually agreed to what were known as the Arusha Ac-
cords, a power sharing agreement very favorable to the RPF. 
The Arusha Accords would have excluded a major anti-Tutsi 
political party from the government, and they would have 
mandated that 50% of Rwanda’s army officers and 40% of its 
troops come from the RPF. The president’s party, though, and 
later President Habyarimana himself, opposed the agreement 
and sought to block its implementation. Others, too, began 
to see the RPF invasion and the Arusha Accords as a threat 
to the gains Hutus had made in the 1959 revolution, when 
the previously subordinate but majority Hutu population had 
gained political power. Each of the opposition parties thus 
split into a “Hutu Power” faction, which aligned with the re-
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gime to oppose the Arusha accords, and a “moderate” faction, 
which continued to support the power-sharing agreement. 
The anti-Arusha Hutu Power forces gained further support 
with the October 21, 1993 assassination of the Hutu presi-
dent of neighboring Burundi by Tutsi army officers and the 
anti-Hutu massacres that followed (FUJII, 2009; MAMDANI, 
2001; PRUNIER, 1995). 
The invasion by Tutsi exiles, the Arusha agreement, and 
the assassination of Burundi’s president were all movements 
of social time, and they led to a resurgence of ethnic griev-
ances in Rwanda. Extremists within the government and their 
allies portrayed the civil war in ethnic terms. Tutsis had op-
pressed Hutus in the past and now sought to do so again. All 
Tutsis were enemies, whether they were members of the Bu-
rundian military, members of the Ugandan based RPF, or or-
dinary Rwandan citizens. But another fateful event occurred 
on April 6, 1994, when President Habyarimana’s plane was 
shot down. The Hutu Power forces immediately blamed the 
Tutsis – the RPF and their “accomplices.” The extremist forces 
began eliminating opposition leaders and formed an interim 
government composed only of the ruling party and the Hutu 
Power factions of the opposition parties. The RPF resumed its 
invasion, and the Hutu Power forces in Rwanda began killing 
Tutsi civilians – eventually about 800,000 of them.
In the Rwandan case, as with the colonial genocides, 
overdiversity and understratification together caused the 
genocide. Where the cultural changes are greatest, as in the 
colonial genocides, the immediate provocation to genocide 
might be small threats to ethnic stratification, such as thefts 
or isolated killings. But in a context of longstanding diver-
sity, as in the Rwandan case, it takes something major, such 
as a rebellion or invasion. So in Rwanda, the RPF invasion 
and the events surrounding it threatened to end – or even to 
reverse – the political dominance of Hutus over Tutsis.
Many other cases are similar. For example, Bosnia’s seces-
sion from Yugoslavia in 1992 would have given Bosnia’s Mus-
lim plurality (44%) political power over less numerous Serbs 
and Croats. Serbs were the dominant ethnic group in the Yu-
goslav Federation, and the Serbs in Bosnia, who made up 31% 
of the population, refused to become subordinate in an inde-
pendent, Muslim-led Bosnia. Aided by the federal army and 
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outside paramilitaries, Bosnian Serbs began taking control of 
parts of Bosnia, and by the end of 1992 the newly declared Re-
publika Srbska covered 70% of what had been Bosnian terri-
tory (CIGAR, 1995, p. 5; JUDAH, 1997, p. 239; MALCOLM, 
1994, pp. 224-238). Because Muslims, Serbs, and Croats lived 
alongside one another throughout Bosnia, in order to turn this 
part of Bosnia into a new Serb state, the Serbs engaged in what 
would come to be called “ethnic cleansing,” which consisted of 
mass killings, imprisonment, gang rapes of women, deporta-
tions, and the destruction of mosques and other cultural arti-
facts (MANN, 2005, pp. 356-357). Genocide was thus only one 
component of the larger campaign of violence against Croats 
and Muslims, their property, and their symbols. In all, 200,000 
to 250,000 Bosnian Muslims were killed – more than 10% of 
their population (GUTMAN, 1993, p. xxxi).
Combinations of overdiversity and understratification 
cause genocide, then. In many cases, as in the previous ex-
amples, these movements of social time are largely identical 
to the aggressors’ grievances against their targets. The griev-
ances accurately describe the targets’ behavior – the cause of 
the genocide. But the aggressors might also make false accu-
sations. Indeed, most genocidal conflicts involve a mixture of 
true and false accusations. In Rwanda, for example, the RPF 
had certainly invaded Rwanda, but they probably did not as-
sassinate President Habyarimana (REUTERS,2012). Hutus 
also falsely accused many Tutsis of conspiring with or aid-
ing the rebels4. In other genocides, the major accusations are 
completely false, perhaps delusional. This was the case during 
the Holocaust, where, according to political scientist Daniel 
Jonah Goldhagen, the Nazis’ “proneness to wild, ‘magical 
thinking’ (…) and their incapacity for ‘reality testing’ gener-
ally distinguishes them from the perpetrators of other mass 
slaughters” (1996, p. 412). One false accusation was of Jewish 
treachery – a “stab in the back” – that led to Germany’s de-
feat in World War I (STAUB, 1989, p.  100; FRIEDLANDER, 
1997, pp. 73-74). But the idea of Jews as organized conspira-
tors went much further. For example, the Nazis believed that 
all their apparent enemies were simply Jewish puppets. The 
Nazis’ form of socialism – National Socialism – differed from 
both capitalism and communism, and they believed that in-
ternational Jewry was the real source behind both of these 
4  One Tutsi survivor, for 
example, tells of the false 
accusations against her fa-
ther, who was said to have 
aided the RPF. After learning 
of these accusations, the 
Hutu man who was hiding 
this woman in his home told 
her, “Your father was a very 
bad Tutsi.” When he said the 
authorities had found 600 
guns in her father’s home 
and a death list of Hutu na-
mes, she became furious: “If 
my father had so many guns, 
why didn’t he pass them out 
to the thousands of Tutsis 
who came to us asking for 
protection (…) why didn’t 
he use the guns to protect 
his wife and daughter from 
killers and rapists?” (ILIBAGI-
ZA, 2007, pp. 95-97).
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competing economic systems. This belief was later confirmed, 
the Nazis believed, by the alliance of capitalist and communist 
nations – the US, Britain, and the Soviet Union – against Ger-
many (SNYDER, 2010, p. 217). More broadly, the Nazis be-
lieved the Jews sought to dominate all of humanity, and that 
they were thus behind all sorts of other evils. Nazi propagan-
dist Joseph Goebbels, speaking of the Jews in 1937, put it like 
this:“Look, there is the world’s enemy, the destroyer of civili-
zations, the parasite among the peoples, the son of Chaos, the 
incarnation of evil, the ferment of decomposition, the demon 
who brings about the degeneration of mankind” (quoted in 
COHN, 1969, p. 204).
False accusations such as these result from the same 
kinds of movements of social time that lead to other geno-
cidal conflicts. For example, warfare is an extreme move-
ment of social time. As we have seen, when wars are inter-
ethnic, they may lead to conflict involving all those who 
share the antagonists’ ethnicity. Wars may also lead to con-
flict with others. When a state loses a war, especially when 
this leads to a loss of territory, genocide becomes more 
likely. The Ottoman Empire had lost almost half of its ter-
ritory during the two centuries prior to the 1915 genocide 
of Armenians in Turkey, and prior to the Holocaust, defeat 
in World War I had resulted in major territorial losses for 
Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire (MIDLAR-
SKY, 2005, pp. 135-162). Neither the Armenians nor the 
Jews were responsible, but in both cases these losses – a 
kind of downward mobility – not only exacerbated the al-
ready existing conflict with the losers’ ethnic inferiors, 
but also led to new, and false, accusations against them. 
In the case of the Holocaust, World War II also threatened 
the Nazis’ status, especially when the war with the Soviet 
Union began to prove much more difficult than expected. 
Hitler blamed the Jews for this war, and it was only after 
the invasion of the Soviet Union that the large-scale mass 
killing of Jews began5. A state that loses a war, loses territo-
ry, or fights a war experiences a rapid loss or threat of loss 
to its status. These social upheavals cause so much conflict 
that they may result in the creation of new enemies, as so-
cially distant and inferior ethnic groups, regardless of their 
actual behavior, are accused of treason and other offenses. 
5  Other movements of so-
cial time, such as Germany’s 
economic depression in the 
1920s and 1930s, as well as 
the Jews’ upward mobility 
during the early 20th cen-
tury, no doubt also contribu-
ted to the false accusations 
that led to the Holocaust 
(BLACK, 2011, pp. 68-70).
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Genocide as deviant behavior
Genocide responds to movements of social time  –  usu-
ally increases in diversity and decreases in stratification. But 
genocide is itself a movement of social time. It decreases diver-
sity and increases stratification, so it, too, causes conflict. The 
targets of genocide condemn their killers, and when they are 
able, they may punish them. For example, in 1921 Soghomon 
Tehlirian, an Armenian, assassinated former Turkish Interior 
Minister Talaat Pasha, one of the architects of the Armenian 
genocide. Likewise, in 1960 Israeli operatives captured Adolf 
Eichmann in Argentina and took him to Israel, where he was 
tried, found guilty, and hanged for his role in the Holocaust. 
Outsiders, too, may involve themselves in genocidal conflicts 
and attempt to punish or prevent genocide. Or they may sim-
ply condemn it. So even though genocide is social control, a 
response to deviant behavior by the targets, it is also a deviant 
behavior – often extreme deviance, or evil – and its perpetra-
tors may be subject to social control by others.
It may seem obvious that genocide is deviant6. But the 
deviant nature of genocide is a variable, not a constant. The 
targets condemn the genocides against them, but the aggres-
sors might see their own actions as praiseworthy. And though 
some outsiders to the conflicts might condemn genocides 
or even try to prevent them, others might not care. Apathy 
was especially common in the distant past, when genocide 
was hardly deviant at all. “The shocking truth,” psychologist 
Steven Pinker notes, “is that until recently most people didn’t 
think there was anything particularly wrong with genocide – 
as long as it didn’t happen to them” (2011, p. 334; cf. CHALK 
and JONASSOHN 1990, p. 8; EVANS, 2008, p. 13; PAYNE, 
2004, pp. 44-51). Since few people in the predmodern world 
viewed genocide as wrong – much less evil – people boast-
ed of the genocides they committed, and they might falsely 
claim to have committed other genocides, exaggerating their 
brutality in order to frighten their enemies or impress their 
subjects (CHALK and JONASSOHN, 1990, pp. 59-60; FREE-
MAN, 1995, pp. 214-220). Even religious leaders might praise 
genocide and condemn restraint, as when Moses, in the Old 
Testament, chastises the Israelite army for allowing defeated 
Midianite women and children to live (NUMBERS 31: 14-
6  It is certainly much more 
common to think of geno-
cide as a deviant behavior 
than to think of it as a form 
of social control – a response 
to the deviant behavior of 
others. After all, most genoci-
de scholars identify with the 
targets of genocide and con-
demn their killers. But social 
science is “value-free” (BER-
GER, 1963, pp. 5-6; BLACK, 
forthcoming; SEUBERT, 1991; 
WEBER, 1958).It cannot tell 
us whether the targets’ or the 
killers’ or our own values are 
correct, and in any case, such 
information would be socio-
logically useless – a distrac-
tion from the task of expla-
nation. Understanding this 
difference – the difference 
between factual statements 
and value judgments – is es-
pecially important when stu-
dying deviant behavior and 
social control, where we are 
otherwise in danger of com-
pletely misunderstanding 
our subject. In this case, if 
we were to mistake our con-
demnation of genocide for a 
sociological classification, we 
might be tempted to think 
of genocide and the social 
control of genocide as beha-
viors completely unlike one 
another. But both are acts of 
social control, reactions to 
deviant behavior. Genocide 
involves moral judgments 
against the targets, and the 
condemnation and punish-
ment of genocide involve 
moral judgments against the 
aggressors. They can be un-
derstood similarly.
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17). But in modern societies, genocide has become more de-
viant. It is roundly condemned, and instead of boasting, those 
who commit genocide – and those who defend them – now 
engage in what is called genocide denial (FREEMAN,1991, p. 
195; PAYNE, 2004, p. 57; PINKER, 2011, p. 335; WIKIPE-
DIA, 2012a).
The move from boasting to denial occurred as genocide in-
creasingly became more deviant. Even the coining of the word 
genocide is an example of this process. After Winston Churchill 
described the Nazis’ destruction of nations as a “crime without a 
name,” jurist Raphael Lemkin determined to name it and to get 
it recognized as a crime under international law (POWER, 2002, 
pp. 29-45). He succeeded, and in 1948 the United Nations passed 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide. This has not always led to the willingness of outsid-
ers to stop it. For fear that it might require military intervention, 
governments are often reluctant even to label an ongoing mass 
killing a genocide (MILES, 2006, pp. 255-256; POWER, 2002). 
But intervention has not been completely absent, and it ap-
pears to be increasing. The International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), established by the United Nations 
after the Rwandan and Bosnian genocides, have convicted more 
than 100 persons of genocide and other international crimes 
(HOLA, SMEULERS, BIJLEVELD, 2011, p. 412). And govern-
ments and intergovernmental organizations sometimes use 
military force to try to prevent or halt genocides and other mass 
killings. Examples include the 1994 United Nations Aid Mission 
for Rwanda (Unamir), a small operation that saved thousands of 
Tutsis, though it was unable to stop the genocide; the 1995 and 
1999 Nato air strikes against Bosnia and Yugoslavia, respectively; 
and the 2011 air strikes against Libya by the United States and 
several other nations. The UN Security Council resolution au-
thorizing the intervention in Libya’s civil war referred to a 2005 
UN document that identified an emerging norm known as the 
“responsibility to protect.” Governments, according to the docu-
ment, have a responsibility to protect their civilian populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity, and when they cannot or will not do so, this becomes 
the international community’s responsibility (EVANS, 2008, pp. 
48-49; WIKIPEDIA, 2012b). 
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We have moved from a world where most people cared little 
about the genocides of others – perhaps not even disapproving of 
them – to a world where genocide is a crime, where international 
courts convict and imprison government officials for killing their 
own citizens, where nations intervene in civil wars to prevent the 
killing of civilians, where humanitarian groups document and 
publicize what they consider human rights violations all over 
the world, and where academics from numerous disciplines fill 
bookshelves with discussions of the evil of genocide and ways to 
prevent it. Why this change? Why is genocide – once ignored or 
even praised – now thought of as an incomprehensible evil? Why 
is genocide so deviant? Why does it attract so much social control?
Genocide has become more deviant, first of all, because it 
is a reduction of diversity – underdiversity – and underdiversity 
has become more deviant in the modern world. Underdiversity 
is more serious in diverse settings, while overdiversity is more 
serious in homogenous settings (BLACK, 2011, p. 139)7. With 
modern communication and transportation technologies have 
comedrastic increases in the diversity in people’s lives – increas-
es, for example, in their knowledge of and participation in other 
cultures and their interaction with cultural outsiders (COWEN, 
2002, pp. 79-80). International organizations like the United Na-
tions or multicultural societies like the US are especially diverse, 
and those associated with them are especially likely to condemn 
political censorship, religious persecution, and other assaults on 
diversity. But genocide is also more deviant now than in the pre-
modern world because it involves a greater movement of social 
time. If the Israelites slaughtered the Midianites, the effects were 
mostly localized, but in an interconnected world with dispersed 
populations, the effects of genocide might be felt all over the 
world. Hitler’s slaughter of European Jews, for example, altered the 
lives of Jews everywhere – and the lives of those connected to them 
relationally or culturally. Lemkin himself pointed to the possible 
effects of genocide on the culture of people other than the targets:
We can best understand this when we realize how impoverished our culture 
would be if the peoples doomed by Germany, such as the Jews, had not been 
permitted to create the Bible, or to give birth to an Einstein, a Spinoza; if the 
Poles had not had the opportunity to give to the world a Copernicus, a Cho-
pin, a Curie; the Czechs, a Huss, a Dvorak; the Greeks, a Plato and a Socrates; 
the Russians, a Tolstoy and a Shostakovich (Quoted in POWER, 2002, p. 53).
7  Likewise, underintimacy is 
more serious between inti-
mates, overintimacy between 
strangers, understratification 
between unequals, and overs-
tratification between equals 
(BLACK, 2011, p. 139).
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The future of genocide
As genocide becomes more deviant, intervention to pre-
vent or punish genocide becomes more likely. And intervention 
makes genocide less likely for two reasons. First, it may directly 
prevent or stop the killing, and indeed, though not all interven-
tions are successful, those that involve direct challenges to the ag-
gressors or support for the targets do tend to reduce the severity 
of genocide (KRAIN, 2005)8. Second, remember that genocide 
occurs in a context of inequality, where the aggressors are supe-
rior to the targets – normally in size, political authority, and mili-
tary strength. But as intervention becomes expected, conflicts are 
equalized. Outside opposition to the aggressors decreases their 
status, and support for the targets increases theirs.
For the same reason, genocide declines with the prolifera-
tion of liberal democracies. Many genocides have been led by 
states, but these are more likely to be totalitarian and authori-
tarian states, where political elites have so much power rela-
tive to the populations they rule, rather than democratic states, 
where political power is more diffuse (RUMMEL, 1994; 1995; 
see also COONEY, 1997b). Already, more than half of the 
world’s population lives in a democracy (up from just over 12% 
in 1900), and the democratic form of government continues to 
spread (MODELSKI and PERRY, 2002, p. 365)9. 
Remember also that genocide is more likely in a context of 
ethnic diversity – where there is cultural distance between ethnic 
groups – and that increasing diversity is one of the common causes 
of genocide. But increasingly, communication and transportation 
technologies allow for social closeness despite physical distance. 
While this increases the diversity in people’s lives by bringing di-
verse peoples into contact with one another, it reduces the distanc-
es between them. They become culturally closer, more intimate, 
and more interdependent (BLACK, 2004, p. 24; COWEN, 2002, p. 
79). Ultimately, globalization destroys the social distances condu-
cive to genocide. There is no genocide in a global village10. 
Already we see a decline in the kinds of situations that lead 
to serious ethnic conflicts, and fewer of these conflicts means less 
genocide. Many of the large movements of social time that com-
monly lead to genocidal conflicts – colonial wars, interstate wars, 
civil wars, and revolutions – are much less common. Colonial wars 
have ended, and since the end of the Cold War, interstate wars 
8  But the possibility of in-
tervention may increase the 
likelihood of genocide in 
some cases. Aggrieved mem-
bers of subjugated ethnic 
groups may rebel against 
their governments – despite 
the likelihood of retaliatory 
genocide and despite the im-
possibility of military success 
– in the expectation that out-
side intervention in response 
to the genocide will enable 
them to achieve their goals 
(KUPERMAN, 2005; 2009). 
Conceivably, then, increasing 
intervention, if it leads to 
more rebellions that provoke 
genocide, could lead to more 
genocide overall.This does 
not appear to be happening, 
though, and in the long term, 
if intervention becomes more 
certain and more effective, 
genocide is likely to decrease.
9  In some cases, though, in-
creasing democratization may 
lead to genocide by giving 
political power to otherwise di-
sadvantaged ethnic majorities 
who have grievances against 
economically successful eth-
nic minorities (CHUA, 2003, 
pp. 163-175; see also MANN, 
2005). To some extent, this is 
what happened in Rwanda. 
But overall, democracies are 
less genocidal than other go-
vernments, and we can expect 
less genocide in the long term.
10 Media theorist Marshall 
McLuhan (1964) coined the 
term “global village” to em-
phasize that modern techno-
logy had made instantaneous 
communication – something 
originally possible only face-
-to-face, at the village level – 
possible on a global scale. Bla-
ck (2011, pp. 148-151) points 
out that as the relationships 
between people throughout 
the world come to resemble 
those of villagers in their clo-
seness, they also resemble 
them morally. People become 
more concerned about what 
happens to one another, and 
they behave more altruistically 
(see also PINKER 2011, p. 292).
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have “become few in number, mostly brief, and relatively low in 
battle deaths” (PINKER, 2011, p. 302). The number of civil wars 
peaked in the 1990s, but has declined since then. The decline in 
the number of deaths caused by civil wars is even greater (Idem, 
pp. 303-305). Revolutions have likewise become less frequent, and 
when they occur, less violent (PAYNE, 2004, pp. 100-115).
The causes of genocide and the conditions associated 
with it are declining, and the people of the world have become 
more hostile to it. But is genocide really any scarcer? All the 
attention given to genocide recently may leave the impression 
that it is not, but the evidence suggests otherwise. Since the 
end of World War II and the mass killings associated with it, 
the world has not again seen such a high level of genocide. 
The killings in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Darfur were severe, but 
they were “spikes in a trend that is unmistakably downward. 
(…) The first decade of the new millennium is the most geno-
cide-free of the past 50 years” (PINKER, 2011, p. 340).
Ending genocide, of course, is the goal of many genocide 
scholars, whose work, as sociologist Thomas Cushman puts it, 
is “characterized by a strong ideological belief that genocide is 
preventable and that knowledge about genocide will help bring 
about prevention” (2003, p. 524). Much of the work on preven-
tion is valuable, and it makes sense for those working to prevent 
genocide to consult it. The larger story about genocide, however, is 
not that it occurs because of a lack of knowledge about its causes. 
Information about genocide cannot prevent genocide if no one 
wishes to prevent it – if people wish instead to exterminate their 
ethnic enemies or to stay out of others’ conflicts. Rather, genocide 
is caused by particular kinds of social changes occurring in par-
ticular social contexts. When the social conditions conducive to 
genocide were strongest, the conditions conducive to genocide 
prevention were weakest. Better knowledge about genocide earlier 
on would not have done much to prevent it. Conversely, perfect 
knowledge about genocide is not required now for its prevention. 
Recent social trends have led to the decline of genocide and to an 
increase in efforts to stop it when it occurs. This is likely to con-
tinue, regardless of how much our theories of genocide advance. 
And the theory I have presented explains why. Perhaps some of 
the trends identified here are only temporary, but should they con-
tinue into the far future, the pure sociology of genocide makes this 
prediction: Genocide is destined for annihilation. 
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RESUMEN: En consonancia con Donald Black, todo 
conflicto resulta de movimientos del tiempo social 
– alteraciones en la diversidad, en la estratificación, 
o en el grado de intimidad. Es el caso para los conflic-
tos genocidas, que envuelven transformaciones en 
términos de diversidad y estratificación. Genocidios 
resultan de ampliaciones en la diversidad, como en 
el caso del contacto intercultural, y reducciones en la 
estratificación, como cuando miembros de un grupo 
étnico subordinado buscan elevar su estatus. Pero el 
genocidio es él propio un movimiento en el tiempo 
social, una reducción de la diversidad y un aumento 
en la estratificación, y que provoca aún más conflic-
to. La teoría presentada em Genocidio y tempo so-
cial explica los conflictos que llevan al genocidio, así 
como aquellos que de él resultan.
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pura, tiempo social, violencia
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